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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 860151 
-v- : 
DENNIS FIXEL, i Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented in this appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err in refusing to dismiss the 
information filed against defendant or to suppress evidence on 
the ground that the police officer involved allegedly violated 
the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-9-3 (1982)? 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction 
of unlawful distribution for value of a controlled substance? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Dennis Fixel, was charged with unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii) (Supp. 1983) 
(amended 1985) (R. 16). After a bench trial, he was found guilty 
as charged (R. 52). The court sentenced defendant to a term of 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison, but suspended the 
sentence and placed him on eighteen months1 probation (R. 53). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 4:00 p.m. on March 5, 1985, an 
undercover officer for the Provo City Police Department 
accompanied David Kling to defendants resident in Pleasant 
Grove, Utah. After Mr. Kling introduced the officer to 
defendant, the officer told defendant he wished to purchase some 
marijuana. Defendant indicated that half an ounce would cost 
sixty dollars. The officer handed three twenty dollar bills to 
Mr. Kling who in turn gave the money to defendant. Defendant 
then left the room, returned shortly thereafter with two small 
plastic baggies containing marijuana and handed them to the 
officer. Soon thereafter, Kling and the officer left (R. 79-84). 
Defendant was subsequently charged with unlawful distribution for 
value of a controlled substance (R. 16). 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion which 
alternatively asked for dismissal of the charge against him or 
suppression of the evidence obtained by the officer on March 5 
(R. 23-28). In the motion defendant argued that the relief 
requested should be granted because the officer had not complied 
with UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-9-3 (1982), a statute dealing with the 
authority of a peace officer beyond his or her normal 
jurisdiction. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion 
(R. 68-68). 
At trial, defendant admitted exchanging the two bags of 
marijuana for the officer's sixty dollars. However, he testified 
that after receiving the money, he had gone to a neighbor to 
obtain the marijuana; the marijuana given to the officer was not 
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his, and he had not retained any of the money for himself (R. 94-
99). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Defendant fails to articulate any grounds upon which 
the trial court was required either to dismiss the charge against 
him or to suppress evidence obtained by a police officer* 
Assuming that the officer was effectively acting as a private 
citizen, the evidence he provided at trial was clearly 
admissible. 
Because this Court misconstrued the pertinent 
controlled substance statutes in State v, Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 




DEFENDANT FAILS TO ARTICULATE ANY GROUND UPON 
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED EITHER TO 
DISMISS THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM OR TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY A POLICE OFFICER. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-9-3 (1982) provides: 
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any 
governmental entity of this state may exercise 
a peace officer's authority beyond the limits 
of such officer's normal jurisdiction as 
follows: 
(a) When in fresh pursuit of an offender for 
the purpose of arresting and holding that 
person in custody or returning the suspect 
to the jurisdiction where the offense was 
committed; 
(b) When a public offense is committed in 
such officer's presence; 
(c) When participating in an investigation 
of criminal activity which originated in 
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such officer's normal jurisdiction in 
cooperation with the local authority; 
(d) When called to assist peace officers of 
another jurisdiction, 
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such 
authorized action, shall notify and receive 
approval of the local law enforcement 
authority, or if such prior contact is not 
reasonably possible, notify the local law 
enforcement authority as soon as reasonably 
possible. Unless specifically requested to 
aid a police officer of another jurisdiction 
or otherwise as provided for by law, no 
legal responsibility for a police officer's 
action outside his normal jurisdiction and 
as provided herein, shall attach to the 
local law enforcement authority. 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss or to suppress 
evidence, the prosecutor conceded that the officer from the Provo 
City Police Department who purchased the marijuana from defendant 
had not complied with § 77-9-3. Defendant contends that, under 
these circumstances, the trial court should have either dismissed 
the charge or suppressed the evidence obtained by the officer. 
Although somewhat confusing, defendant's argument 
appears to be premised on the notion that the officer, because he 
failed to comply with § 77-9-3, could not validly have exercised 
peace officer powers in Pleasant Grove City and thus was acting 
as a private citizen when he purchased marijuana from defendant. 
Concluding that the officer, in his capacity as a private 
citizen, was acting illegally in making the buy (i.e., in 
violation of the state's drug laws), defendant argues that the 
trial court was obligated to grant him the relief he sought prior 
to trial. However, assuming that the officer was acting as a 
private citizen, and in violation of the drug laws, that fact 
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alone would not require suppression of the evidence he obtained. 
A party to a crime often provides the evidence against another 
party that leads to the latterfs conviction. See, e.g.# State v. 
Schreuder, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, P.2d (1986). Although 
his noncompliance with S 77-9-3 may have exposed him to criminal 
liability or discipline from his department, the officer involved 
could legally provide evidence against defendant. Furthermore, 
defendant has not articulated any violation of the fourth 
amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 
14 of the Utah Constitution that would justify suppression. See 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(g) (UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-12(g) (1982)) 
(adopted by the Court in In Re Rules of Procedure, 18 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 3 (1985)); State v. Newbold, 581 P.2d 991 (Utah 1972) 
(recognizing the principle that the constitutional prohibition 
against unreasonable searches or seizures does not apply to 
searches or seizures by private persons). 
All of the cases defendant cites in support of his 
position are distinguishable in that they hold that an arrest or 
detention effected by a police officer outside of his or her 
jurisdiction was illegal, and therefore required dismissal of the 
charges or suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of 
the detention or arrest. The officer who engaged defendant did 
not detain or arrest him; he merely obtained evidence from 
defendant. Unlike the cited cases, the officer did not exercise 
his peace officer authority in dealing with defendant outside of 
his normal jurisdiction. 
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Based upon the foregoing discussion, the trial court 
properly denied defendant's pretrial motion. 
POINT 11 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF DISTRIBUTION FOR 
VALUE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
Relying primarily on gtate v. Ontiveros, 674 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1983), defendant urges that because the State presented no 
evidence that he retained any portion of the money he received in 
the drug transaction with the officer, the evidence was 
insufficient to support his conviction for distribution for value 
of a controlled substance. He suggests that the crime, if any, 
was arranging the distribution for value of a controlled 
substance under UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1983) 
(amended 1985) • 
Defendant was charged with violating UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1983) (amended 1985), which provided: 
(a) Except as authorized by this act, it 
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly 
and intentionally: 
• . . 
(ii) to distribute for value or possess 
with intent to distribute for value a 
controlled or counterfeit substancel.il 
Two sections within the definitions portion of the Controlled 
Substances Act are important to the proper interpretation of § 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Section 58-37-2(8) provides: 
The word "distribute" means to deliver other 
than by administering or dispensing a controlled 
substance. "Distribute for value" means to 
1 Minor word changes were made in subsection (a) by the 1985 
legislation. See 1985 Utah Laws ch. 146, § 1. 
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deliver a controlled substance in exchange for 
compensation, consideration, or item of value, 
or a promise therefor. The word "distributor" 
means a person who distributes controlled 
substances. 
Section 58-37-2(6) reads: 
The word "deliver" or "delivery" means the 
actual, constructive, or attempted transfer 
of a controlled substance, whether or not 
there exists an agency relationship. 
Applying the first sentence of § 58-37-2(8) and the 
definition of "delivery" provided in § 58-37-2(6) to the facts of 
the Ontiveros case, it is clear that the defendant there was 
guilty of distributing a controlled substance. Under a literal 
reading of the second sentence of § 58-37-2(8), it would appear 
that he was also guilty of "distributing! for value," in that 
there is no requirement that the distributor retain any portion 
of the "compensation, consideration, or item of value" received 
in exchange for delivery of the controlled substance. In other 
words, the distributor need only receive^ something of value; he 
or she would not necessarily have to profit personally from the 
transaction. £f. State v. Leek, 26 Wash. App. 651, 64i P.2d 209, 
211 (1980) (holding that under Washington's statute making it 
unlawful "to sell for profit any controlled substance," "the 
receipt of any item or thing of some worth in exchange for a 
controlled substance is what is meant by the words "for 
profit1"). Nevertheless, this Court held that the evidence was 
2
 The word "receive" is used here as it is defined in Webster's 
New Collegiate Dictionary (1981), which is as follows: 
"1. to come into possession of" 
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not sufficient to show that Ontiveros was guilty of distribution 
for valuef because "Itlhe evidence only showled] that the 
appellant acted as the officer's agent in making the purchase 
from a third party," Ontiveros. 674 P.2d at 104. 
Apparently, the Ontiveros Court took the position, as 
have some other courts construing similar provisions, that the 
"distribute for value" language contained in § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) 
does not apply to a person who is simply an intermediary between 
the real buyer and seller. See. e.g., People v. Lam Lek Chong, 
407 N.Y.S.2d 674, 678-680, 379 N.E.2d 200, 205-206, cert, denied, 
439 U.S. 935 (1978). However, such a construction was not 
justified, given the clear definition of "distribute for value" 
contained in §§ 58-37-2(6) and (8). The Ontiveros interpretation 
imposes upon the state the nearly impossible burden, in many 
cases, of proving that a distributor did not one hour, or one 
day, or one week after the transaction deliver all the proceeds 
of the "sale" to the "real" seller — a burden not contemplated 
by § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) and one that cannot validly be read into 
it by this Court. Cannon v. McDonald, 615 P.2d 1268, 1270 (Utah 
1980) (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-3-11 (1978)) (noting that when 
the construction of a statutory provision involves phrases 
defined by statute, the provision must be construed according to 
the definition); State v. Leek, 6 « P.2d at 211-12. 
Furthermore, the Court's conclusion in Ontiveros that 
the case was "a classic case of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance for value" is highly questionable. The 
classic case of arranging is best illustrated in State v. 
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Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979) , where the defendant merely 
arranged a meeting between the buyer (an informant) and the 
seller; he took no part in either the distribution of the 
controlled substance or the receipt of the money paid for it. 
gee also State v. Hicken, 659 P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983). The 
Ontiveros fact situation only became arranging when the Court did 
not apply the literal statutory definition of "distribute for 
value" to a transaction where the defendant apparently acted only 
as an intermediary between the buyer and the seller. In arriving 
at the arranging conclusion the Ontiveros opinion also ignored 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1)(c) (Supp. 1983) (amended 1985) 
(defining unlawful distribution for no value) which, given the 
Court's interpretation of the "for value" language contained in § 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (which, the State believes, was incorrect), 
should have been the section relied upon for reversing the 
conviction, not the arranging provision. There can be little 
dispute that the defendant in Ontiveros committed an act that 
constituted distribution as defined in § 58-37-2(6). 
Based upon the foregoing discussion, and with all due 
respect to the Court, Ontiveros appears to have been wrongly 
decided and should be overruled in the instant case.3 The 
evidence clearly established that defendant personally exchanged 
a controlled substance for money — an act that, under a literal 
3 in a previous case now pending before the Court, State v. 
Udell, Case No. 19641, the State seriously questioned Ontiveros 
and argued that it should be limited to its facts. Upon further 
reflection, the State now believes that Ontiveros should be 
overruled as a misconstruction of the relevant statutes. 
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reading of the pertinent statutes, constituted the unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance. That defendant 
may not have retained for himself any of the money he received in 
exchange for the marijuana is inconsequential. What is 
significant, as far as § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) is concerned, is that 
defendant physically received something of value in exchange for 
the drug. Although the language chosen and the sentence 
structure used might have been better, § 58-37-8, as it relates 
to this case, clearly defines several distinct situations under 
which a person may be found guilty of a crime. First, when a 
person either distributes a controlled substance for value or 
possesses it with the intent to distribute it, he is guilty of 
the offense defined in § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Second, when a 
person "agree[si, consent Is], offer[si, or arrange Is]" to 
distribute for value a controlled substance or a substance in 
lieu of a controlled substance, he is guilty of the offense 
defined in § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv). See Hicken. Violation of either 
of those sections carries the same penalty. § 58-37-8(1)(b). 
Finally, when a person distributes a controlled substance, 
"wherein nothing of value is exchanged for such distribution," he 
is guilty of the lesser offense defined in § 58-37-8(1)(c). 
Under this scheme, the evidence was plainly sufficient to support 
defendants conviction of distribution for value under the 
offense defined in § 58-37-8(1) (a)(ii). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's 
conviction should be affirmed. JL 
RESPECTFULLY submitted t h i s oQ day of August, 1986, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Brief were mailed, postage prepaid, to Gregory M. 
Warner, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin, Attorney for Appellant, 
P.O. Box "L", Provo, Utah 84603, this £3- day of August, 1986. 
^ W t ^ Jj •S=$&>uf*<^ 
-11-
